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Collins: Torts: Civil Liability in the Use of Deadly Force in North Caroli

TORTS: CIVIL LIABILITY IN THE USE OF DEADLY
FORCE IN NORTH CAROLINA
INTRODUCTION

Many states,' including North Carolina,2 have adopted the
Model Penal Code 3:073 in whole or in part as the basis for statutes
1. Mogin, The Policeman's Privilege to Shoot A Fleeing Suspect: Constitutional Limits on the Use of Force, 18 AM. CluM. L. REv. 533, 539 n.40 (1981)
(hereinafter cited as Limits on the Use of Deadly Force); see COLO. REV. STAT. §
18-1-707 (2)(6) (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 467 (c) (1979); HAWAII REv. STAT.
§ 703-307 (3) (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.8 (West 1979); Ky. REv. STAT. §
503.90 (2) (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 A, § 107-2 (B) (1980); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.066 (subd. 2) (West supp. 1981); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1412 (1979);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401 (d)(2) (1978); TEx. PENAL CODE tit. 2, § 9.51 (c)
(Vernon 1974).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2) (1978).
(2) A law enforcement officer is justified in using deadly physical force
upon another person for a purpose specified in subdivision (1) of this
subsection only when it is or appears to be reasonably necessary thereby:.
(a) to defend himself or third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly force;
(b) to effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of a
person whom he reasonably believes is attempting to escape by means of
a deadly weapon or any other means indicates that he presents an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to others unless apprehended without delay; or
(c) to prevent the escape of a person from custody imposed upon
him as a result of a conviction for a felony.
Nothing in this subdivision constitutes justification for willful, malicious
or criminally negligent conduct by any person which injures or endangers
any person or property, nor shall it be construed to excuse or justify the
use of unreasonable or excessive force.
3. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3:07(2)(b) (1962).
(b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless:
(i) the arrest is for a felony; and
(ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace
officer or is assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized as a
peace officer; and
(iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial
risk of injury to innocent persons; and
(iv) the actor believes that:
(1) the crime of which the arrest is made involved conduct including the use of or threatened use of deadly force; or
(2) there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will
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which establish the standards for the privileged use of deadly force
by law enforcement officers. These statutes attempt to clarify those
situations in which a law enforcement officer may use deadly force
to effect an arrest without incurring civil or criminal liability."
While the statute enacted by the General Assembly of North Carolina6 does much to clarify the circumstances under which the use
of deadly force is privileged, the statute contains a paragraph
added to the language of the Model Penal Code, the interpretation
of which is crucial to the determination of the extent of a law enforcement officer's liability in the use of deadly force.' The existence of a statutory privilege which modifies the privilege afforded
an officer at common law7 plays an important role in the availability of recovery for persons injured by an officer's use of deadly
force.
This comment will attempt to analyze the justified use of
deadly force by law enforcement officers in North Carolina and the
extent to which an officer is shielded from civil liability arising out
of the use of deadly force under North Carolina General Statutes §
15A-401 (d)(2). (The N.C. General Statutes are hereinafter cited as
G.S.)
BACKGROUND

At common law, a law enforcement officer was generally empowered to employ such reasonable force as was necessary to apprehend a suspect.' He was allowed to use deadly force to apprehend a felon but was prohibited from using deadly force to
cause death or serious bodily injury if his apprehension is not made.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2) adopts in principle the MODEL PENAL CODE but
does not include (b)(iii) and adds a provision which justifies deadly force against
an escaped convicted felon.
4. State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 231 S.E. 2d 833 (1977); Comment, The Use of
Deadly Force to Arrest, 12 CREIGHTON L. Rzv. 655, 662 (1978), (hereinafter cited
as Use of Deadly Force).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2) (1978).

6. Id.
Nothing in this subdivision constitutes justification for willful, malicious
or criminally negligent conduct by any person which endangers any per-

son or property, nor shall it be construed to excuse or justify the use of
unreasonable or excessive force. Id.
7. See text accompanying notes 8 through 19.
8. Greenestone, Liability of Police Officers for Misuse of Their Weapons, 16
CLEV.-MAR.

L. Rzv. 397, 402 (1967); (hereinafter cited as Liability of Police

Officers).
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apprehend a misdemeanant. 9. At common law, crimes which were
classified as felonies (murder, rape, manslaughter, burglary, lar-

ceny, mayhem and arson) were capital offenses. 10 Conviction of a
felony meant death and forfeiture of property."' In fact, arrest for
a felony was tantamount to conviction. 2 Few safeguards protected
the accused and felony prosecutions rarely ended in acquittals.1 3
The right to speedy trial was unheard of and "rotting in prison was
a reality. It was only a question of time when the accused died;
immediately at the hands of his apprehenders or later in the law
enforcement process."14 Misdemeanors, on the other hand, were

less serious crimes which did not threaten life or limb,

5

and were

means.1

punishable by much less drastic
Deadly force could not be
used to apprehend a misdemeanant even if he might otherwise escape.' 7 The common law rationale for justifying the use of deadly
force against felons but not against misdemeanants was that any-

one capable of committing a felony and thus facing near certain
death if captured, should be presumed so desperate as to be capable of using any means to prevent apprehension."8 The danger
which a felon presented to society, therefore, required that his captors be authorized to employ any means necessary to effect his
apprehension. 1 '
9. Supra note 4, Use of Deadly Force, at 660. see 4 W.
tm

Ar=mS

BLACKSTONE,

COM-

292 (Garland ed. 1978); 3 W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH

LAW

311-12 (5th ed. 1942).
10. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 10-11 (2d ed. 1969).
11. Id.; see generally BLACKSTONE supra note 9, at 98 ("The idea of felony is
indeed so connected with that of capitol punishment that we find it hard to separate them; and to this usage the interpretation of the law does now conform.").
12. BLALOCK, CiVn. LIAUmrrv OF LAW ENFORcEsmrr OFFICESS 46-47 (1974).

13. Id.
14. Id.; see Comment, Use of Deadly Force in Arrest Process, 31 LA. L. REv.
131, 132-33 (1968). (hereinafter cited as Arrest Process).
15. R. PERKINs supra note 10, at 11.

16. United States v. Coppersmith, 4 F. 198, 202 (W.D. Tenn. 1880); see W.
supra note 9, at 94.
17. Limits on the use of Deadly Force supra note 1, at 538; Thomas v.
Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502, 508, 18 S.W. 854, 856 (1892) ("[It would ill become the
BLACKSTONE,

'majesty' of law to sacrifice a human life to avoid a failure of justice in the case of

a petty offender.").
18. Holloway v. Moser, 193 N.C. 185, 187, 136 S.E. 375, 376 (1927). ("The
reason for the distinction is obvious. Ordinarily, the security of person and property is not endangered by a misdemeanant being at large, while the safety and
security of society requires the speedy arrest and punishment of a felon.").
19. Id.
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By modern definition and penal standards, a felony is a more
serious crime than a misdemeanor." No longer are felonies limited
to crimes which involve conduct which endangers life or limb."
Under modern legislation, many statutory misdemeanors are more
dangerous to life and limb than many felonies.22 In light of these
modern legislative enactments, the distinction between the justified use of deadly force against felons but not misdemeanants becomes less tenable. 3 The common law distinction which allows the
use of deadly force against felons but not misdemeanants has
proved generally unacceptable; legislatures of many states have
discarded it in favor of their own legislative pronouncements. '
Historically the use of deadly force by law enforcement officers has
been governed exclusively by state law.25 To the extent that conduct of law enforcement officers conforms to state law, the use of
deadly force is privileged; the officer is insulated from criminal and
civil liability."
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 555 (5th ed. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1
(1981).
A felony is a crime which:
(1) was a felony at common law;
(2) is or may be punishable by death;
(3) is or may be punishable by imprisonment in the state's prison;
or
(4) is denominated a felony by statute.
Any other crime is a misdemeanor.
21. Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1975). ("Many American
jurisdictions .. . have of course expanded the number of felonies to include numerous crimes not involving force or violence, crimes which relate to property and
to compliance with complex government regulations [e.g., income tax fraud].").
22. Id.; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 Comment (Tent. Draft. No. 8
1958). Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33 (Misdemeanor assaults, batteries, and
affrays, simple and aggravated) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-377 (Intentional losing
of an athletic contest or limiting margin of victory or defeat).
23. Use of Deadly Force to Arrest, supra note 4, at 660. See United States v.
Clark, 31 F. 710, 713 (E.D. Mich. 1877); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07, at 56-57 Comment (Tent. Draft. No. 8 1958).
24. See Note, Justifiable Use of Deadly Force by the Police: A Statutory
Review, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 67, 77-78 (1970). (hereinafter cited as Statutory
Survey).
25. Use of Deadly Force to Arrest, supra note 4, at 655. See Pearson The
Right to Kill in Making Arrests, 28 MICH. L. REv. 957 (1930); Statutory Survey,
supra note 24, at 67.
26. Id.; e.g. Jones v. Marshall, 28 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975); People v. Klien,
305 Ill. 141, 137 N.E. 145 (1922); State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 231 S.E.2d 833
(1977); Perry v. Gibson, 247 N.C. 212, 100 S.E.2d 341 (1957); Pierce v. Honeycutt,
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The problem all legislatures face when formulating rules to
govern the justified use of deadly force by law enforcement officers
is to balance the possible inefficiencies which may arise from the
officer's fear of civil suit by a party injured at his hands against
society's fear that it will have no recourse against the misuse of
force by law enforcement officers.2 7 Six states28 have no statute on
the justified use of deadly force by law enforcement officers and
retain the common law felony-misdemeanor distinction.29 Nineteen
states have codified the common law rule.30 A number of states"1
have discarded the common law rule and now restrict the use of
deadly force by law enforcement officers to use against only those
216 N.C. 270, 4 S.E.2d 611 (1939); Sutton v. Williams, 199 N.C. 546, 155 S.E. 160
(1930).
27. Liability of Police Officers, supra note 8, at 400; see Colorado v. Hutchinson, 9 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1925); Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles, 233 Cal. App. 2d
131, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1965); Rayano v. City of New York, 138 N.Y.S.2d 267 (S.
Ct. 1955).
28. Limits on Use of Deadly Force, supra note 1, at 539 n.38; see Vacarro v.
Collier, 38 F.2d 862, 868 (D. Md 1930), modified on other grounds 51 F.2d 17 (4th
Cir. 1931) (construing Maryland law); Davis v. Hellwig, 21 N.J. 412, 416, 122 A.2d
497, 499 (1956); State v. Elder, 120 N.E. 508, 510 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1953); Stinnett
v. Commonwealth, 55 F.2d 644, 646-47 (4th Cir. 1932) (construing Virginia law);
State v. Sims, 139 W.Va. 92, 108, 79 S.E.2d 277, 288 (1953); Commonwealth v.
Klein, 372 Mass 823, 830, 363 N.E.2d 1313, 1318 (1977).
29. Id.
30. Limits on Use of Deadly Force, supra note 1, at 539 n.37; see ALA. CODE
§ 13 A-3-27 (b) (Cure. Supp. 1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53 a-22 (c)(2) (West 1972);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.05 (West 1976); IDAHO CODE § 19-610 (1979); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-41-3-3 (b)(2) (Bums Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3215 (1) (1981);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15 (d) (1972); NEv. STAT. § 200.140 (3) (1979); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 627.5 (II)(b)(1) (Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-6 (c) (1978);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 21 § 732 (3) (West 1958); R&I. GEN. LAws § 12-7-9 (1981);
S.D. CODnID LAWS ANN.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 22-16-32 (2) (1979); TENN.

CODE ANN.

§ 9 A-16.040 (3) (1977); Wis.

§ 40-808 (1975);

§ 939.45 (4)
(West 1958).
31. Limits on Use of Deadly Force, supra note 1, at 539, n.39; see ALAsKA
STAT. § 11.81 370 (1) (1978); Aam REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-410 (A)(3) (1978); GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-902 (a) (1978); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 38 37-5 (A)(2) (1972); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 14.20 (2) (West 1974); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 35.30 (1)(a)(ii) (McKinney
1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07 (2)(d) (1976); OR. REv. STAT. § 161.239
(1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 508 (a)(1) (Purdon 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-2-404 (2) (1978). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 196 (3) (West 1970) and compare
with Kortum v. Alkire, 69 Cal. App. 3d 325, 333, 138 Cal. Rpts. 26, 30-31 (1977)
(By case law a California statute has been construed to allow police to use deadly
STAT. ANN.

force against only those persons suspected of forcible felonies.).
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persons who are suspected of forcible felonies.32 The rest of the
states"3 have adopted, either in whole or in part, Model Penal Code
3:07 3 which restricts the use of deadly force by law enforcement
officers to use against persons, who by their own use of deadly
5
force, pose a serious threat to the safety of the public.Under the Model Penal Code standard, the use of deadly force
is justified if the officer believes the force is necessary and believes
that the individual sought has either committed a crime involving
the use of deadly force or else is substantially likely to create a risk
of death or serious injury unless apprehended immediately. 6 Liability, therefore, is contingent upon the amount of force the law
enforcement officer actually believed to be required under the situation.3 The subjective emphasis of this standard eliminates the requirement that plagues those jurisdictions which adhere to the felony-misdemeanor rule, 8 that in order to avoid liability an officer
be certain the person against whom deadly force is to be employed

is in fact a felon and in fact cannot be apprehended without the
use of deadly force.39
32. Id.
33. See supra note 1.
34. See supra note 3.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see Police Misuse of Weapons, supra note 8, at 401 ("The reasonableness of the police officer's actions is generally examined from the point of view
of the policeman at the time and under the circumstances of the occurrences
which led to the injury. It is unfair to hold the police officer to limits of force
expressed in pounds and ounces ....

.

38. Felony-misdemeanor rule is the judicial acceptance or statutory codification of the common law privilege discussed above. See supra text accompanying
notes 8 through 19.
39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 Comment (a) (Tent. Draft No. 8 1956) ("The
felony-misdemeanor distinction is inherently incapable of separating out these
persons of such dangerousness that the perils arising from failure to accomplish
immediate apprehension justify resort to extreme force to accomplish it."); see
Limits on Use of Deadly Force, supra note 1, at 538 ("Most American Courts did
not closely adhere to the rationale underlying the distinction between felons and
misdemeanants. Accepting the premise that deadly force could be used to apprehend a felon they readily concluded that it would be unfair to make the officer's
privilege depend upon whether a jury viewing the facts with advantages of hindsight and the calm of the jury room determine a suspect had in fact committed a
felony."); Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) ("Detached reflection
cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife."); Holloway v. Moser,
193 N.C. 185, 136 S.E. 375 (1927).
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ANALYSIS

G.S. § 15A-401(d)(2) adopts the Model Penal Code standard
40
for the justified use of deadly force by law enforcement officers.
However, the General Assembly of North Carolina added a paragraph to the language of the Model Penal Code,41 the interpretation of which will affect the scope of the privilege conferred on law
enforcement officers in the use of deadly force."

G.S. § 15A-

401(d)(2) reads in part: "Nothing in the subdivision constitutes
justification for willful, malicious or criminally negligent conduct
by any person which injures or endangers any person or property
nor shall it be construed to justify the use of unreasonable or excessive force." 3 Professor Leon Corbett has written that the drafters of the North Carolina statute referred to New York Penal Law
§ 35.3044 as a basis for G.S. § 15A-401(d)(2)." The New York stat40. Limits on the Use of Deadly Force, supra note 1, at 539.
41. Corbett, Criminal Process and Arrest under the North Carolina PreTrial Criminal Procedure Act of 1974, 10 WAKE FoREST L. Rzv. 377, 413-14
(1974) (hereinafter cited as Criminal Process).
42. See text accompanying notes 56 through 74.
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2) (1978) (emphasis supplied).
44. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 35.30 (McKinney 1967).
1. A peace officer, in the course of effecting or attempting to effect an
arrest, or of preventing or attempting to prevent the escape from custody, of a person whom he reasonably believes to have committed an
offense, may use physical force when and to the extent he reasonably
believes such to be necessary to effect the arrest, or to prevent the escape
from custody, or to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force; except
that he may use deadly physical force for such purposes only when he
reasonably believes that:
(a) The offense committed by such person was:
(i) a felony or an attempt to commit a felony involving the
use or attempted use or threatened imminent use of physical
force against a person; or
(ii) kidnapping, arson, escape in the first degree, burglary in
the first degree or any attempt to commit such a crime; or
(b) The offense committed or attempted by such person was a felony and that, in the course of resisting arrest therefor or attempting to escape from custody, such person is armed with a firearm or
deadly weapon; or
(c) Regardless of the particular offense which is the subject of the
arrest or attempted escape, the use of deadly physical force is necessary to defend the peace officer or another person from what the
officer reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly
physical force.
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ute contains a similar paragraph which states in part that although
an officer is justified under the provisions of the statute in the use
of deadly force, "the statute does not constitute justification of
reckless conduct by such officer amounting to an offense against or
with respect to innocent persons whom he is not seeking to arrest
or retain in custody.' 46 The words "willful," "malicious," "reckless" and "criminal negligence" imply conduct which is more than
simple negligence, an extreme departure from the exercise of ordinary care.'7 However, the Practice Commentary to the New York
statute alters the usual meaning of "reckless," stating that the paragraph in question is "aimed at protecting the innocent bystander
from police action which, though in the line of duty, is performed
recklessly or negligently."'8 The General Assembly of North Carolina did not follow the New York interpretation on this point. The
General Assembly modified the original draft of the paragraph "by
striking out the reference to 'reckless' conduct by an arresting officer and inserting instead that the subdivision did not justify 'willful' or 'malicious' conduct." 49 The Official Commentary to the
North Carolina Statute fails to explain the meaning of the lan2. The fact that a peace officer is justified in using deadly physical force
under circumstances prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subdivision
one does not constitute justification for reckless conduct by such peace
officer amounting to an offense against or with respect to innocent persons whom he is not seeking to arrest or retain in custody.
3. A person who has been directed by a peace officer to assist such peace
officer to effect an arrest or to prevent an escape from custody may use
physical force, other than deadly physical force, when and to the extent
that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to carry out such peace
officer's direction, unless he knows that the arrest or prospective arrest is
not or was not authorized and he may use deadly physical force under
such circumstances when:
(a) He reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself
or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or
imminent use of deadly physical force under the circumstances.
45. Criminal Process, supra note 41, at 413.
46. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30 (McKinney 1967) (emphasis supplied).
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 932 (5th ed. 1979). ("The usual meaning as-

signed to 'willful,' 'wanton' or 'reckless' . . . is that the actor has intentionally
done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to him or so
obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it and so great as to make it
highly probable that harm would follow.")
48. Hechtman, Practice Commentaries,McKinney's CONS. LAWS PENAL LAW
§ 35.30 (1981) (emphasis supplied).
49. CriminalProcess, supra note 41, at 413.
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guage used in the paragraph.50 Professor Corbett suggests that the
final paragraph of G.S. § 15A-401(d)(2) "makes explicit in the negative, the positive implications of the authorizing statute's statement that it must appear to be 'reasonably necessary' to use
deadly force. Since the apparent necessity is assessed from the officer's perspective, this added paragraphsets the minimum standards of reasonablenessfor the officer's exercise in judgment."'1
Under G.S. § 15A-401(d)(2), the use of deadly force to effect
an arrest is justified if deadly force is, or reasonably appears to the
officer to be, necessary to: (a) defend himself or a third party from
the imminent use of deadly force by the suspect; (b) to prevent
escape of a person who is using deadly force as means to escape or
else the use of deadly force is reasonably believed to represent a
threat of imminent bodily harm to another; or (c) to prevent the
52
escape of one in custody as a result of a conviction of a felony.
The statute expressly denies authorization of the use of deadly
force if the force used constitutes willful, malicious or criminally
negligent conduct which injures or endangers any person or property.' 3 Similarly, the statute expressly denies authorization of the
use of unreasonable or excessive force."
Thus, under the statute, a law enforcement officer in North
Carolina is not justified in the use of deadly force if his conduct
amounts to willful, malicious or criminally negligent conduct. 65
The commonly used example is a police officer who fires into a
crowded street at an armed and fleeing suspect." Despite that the
officer may actually believe the use of deadly force is reasonably
necessary in the situation, his conduct is "in disregard of a risk so
obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it and so
great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow."' 7
This much is "explicit in the negative."" Here the law enforcement officer is not justified in the use of deadly force and civil liability attaches for any injury to innocent bystanders."
50.
51.
52.
53.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2) Comment (1978).
Criminal Process, supra note 41, at 401 (emphasis supplied).
N.C. GEN STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2) (1978).
Id.

54. Id.
55. Id.; CriminalProcess, supra note 41, at 401.

56. Id.
57. BLAcKs LAW DICTIONARY 932 (5th ed. 1979); see supra note 47.
58. Criminal Process, supra note 41, at 401.
59. Id.
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The statute's application is less clear to a police officer who
fires into an empty street at an armed and fleeing suspect and the
bullet passes into a nearby shop, injuring a shopkeeper. Assuming
the officer believed the use of deadly force was reasonably necessary and absent some actual or imputed knowledge that he would
injure the shopkeeper, the officer's conduct would amount to
neither criminal negligence nor "willful or malicious conduct which
endangers any person or property." 60 The officer's conduct conforms to the minimum standards of reasonableness of the statute."
Upon these facts, the courts should construe G.S. § 15A401(d)(2) to shield the officer from any criminal or civil liability
arising from injuries sustained by the shopkeeper. In a recent New
York case, 2 the New York Supreme Court applied New York Penal Law § 35.30 to an analogous situation." It is clear from Professor Corbett's commentary that G.S. § 15A-401(d)(2) was patterned
after the New York law." Thus, an analysis of the New York statute is helpful in ascertaining the scope of the privilege conferred
upon a law enforcement officer by G.S. § 15A-401(d)(2). The defendant in the New York case asserted that his shooting of a fleeing robber was per se justified under New York Penal Law § 35.30
and, therefore, he could not be subject to criminal prosecution by
an injured innocent bystander. 6" The defendant was charged with
reckless endangerment and negligent assault; the New York Supreme Court dismissed the negligent assault charge but allowed
the reckless endangerment charge to stand." The Court noted that
New York Penal Law § 35.30 is an amended statute.' While the
statute's predecessor allowed liability to attach for negligent conduct, the amended statute's language eliminates negligent conduct
as a predicate for liability." Any confusion with respect to the
60. Id.; see supra note 47.
61. Id.
62. People v. Jacobs, 105 Misc. 2d 616, 432 N.Y.S. 2d 614 (1980).
63. Id. (The defendant, a 64 year old civilian robbery victim, was charged
with reckless endangerment arising from his shooting of a passerby as he was attempting to stop a fleeing robber. The defendant contended that § 35.30 shielded
him from criminal liability arising out of the injuries incurred by the passerby.)
64. Criminal Process, supra note 41, at 413.
65. People v. Jacobs, 105 Misc. 2d 616, 620, 432 N.Y.S. 2d 614, 618 (1980).
66. Id. at 619.
67. Id. at 618.
68. Id. The New York Court expressly rejects the Practice Commentary's alteration of the usual meaning of "reckless." See supra text accompanying note 48.
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statute on this point is caused by the Practice Commentary which
accompanies the New York statute." Despite the change in the
statute's language, the Practice Commentary has remained unchanged since the amendment of New York Penal Law § 35.30.70
The New York Court concluded that the legislative amendment
was both rational and deliberate," and accordingly, with respect to
negligent assault, a police officer would be shielded from liability.72
An analysis of the North Carolina statute should yield the same
result. The intent of the General Assembly of North Carolina, as
gleaned from the legislative history and the literal reading of the
statute,78 is the same as that of the legislature of the State of New
York: to shield law enforcement officers from liability arising from
their negligent use of deadly force but not with respect to their
reckless use. 74
North Carolina has a long history of allowing liability to attach to law enforcement officers for acts which go beyond the limits of their authority. 7 ' Indeed, several cases" give one reason to
believe that North Carolina case law conforms to the standard laid
down by the Supreme Court of Michigan: "We know of no better
standard to determine a claim of negligence on the part of a police
officer than by comparing his conduct to the care which a reasonably prudent man would exercise in the discharge of official duties
tiaily equivalent to the use of "willful," "malicious" and "criminally negligent" in

N.C. GEN. STAT. 15A-401(d)(2).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. ("There is nothing inherently unreasonable in a decision by the Legislature to absolve anyone from criminal responsibility if he performs a lawful act
in a negligent manner. There is of course, greater culpability when a person acts
recklessly than when he acts negligently. Failure to perceive a risk is palpably less
serious than consciously disregarding a risk.")
72. Id. at 619.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 43 through 51.
74. Id.
75. State v. [rick, 291 N.C. 480, 231 S.E.2d 833 (1977); Perry v. Gibson, 247
N.C. 212, 100 S.E.2d 341 (1957); Pierce v. Honeycutt, 216 N.C. 270, 4 S.E.2d 611
(1939); Sutton v. Williams, 199 N.C. 546, 155 S.E. 160 (1930); Hanie v. Rice, 194
N.C. 234, 139 S.E. 380 (1929); Sossoman v. Cruse, 133 N.C. 470, 477-478, 45 S.E.
757, 764 (1903) ("It behooves the officerts] of the law to be very careful that they
do not misbehave themselves in the discharge of their duty for if they do they
may forfeit its special protection."); Furr v. Moss, 52 N.C. 527 (1860); State v.
Stallcup, 24 N.C. 50 (1841).
76. Id.
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of

North Carolina, in looking at both prior case law and Professor
Corbett's analysis, has concluded that G.S. § 15A-401(d)(2) "was
designed to codify and clarify those situations, in which a police
officer may use deadly force without fear of civil or criminal liabil78s
ity.

There is no reason to conclude that G.S. § 15A-401(d)(2)

does not set down the standard of care required of law enforcement officers in the use of deadly force.
The rationale behind the common law justification for the use
of deadly force against felons was premised on the idea that a
felon, faced with imminent capture, would present a serious threat
to the safety of society.7 9 Only in situations in which the threat of
injury to the public was likely did the common law allow law enforcement officers the use of deadly force." The rationale of the
modern rules regarding the justified use of deadly force by law enforcement officers is the same as that of the common law. Deadly
force may be directed at those individuals who present an imminent threat to the safety of the public. At common law, felons
presented such a threat. Today, legislatures have specified the situations in which the use of deadly force is authorized. The North
Carolina statute reflects the Model Penal Code view that the use of
deadly force is justified only against dangerous criminals--the
armed escapee fleeing his captors by means of deadly force; the
person who poses an imminent threat of serious injury to the officer or a third party; or the escaped convicted felon.
The fundamental problem which faces legislatures in formulating rules of law to govern the use of deadly force by law enforcement officers is the balancing of two important social policies.81
Modern society requires effective law enforcement. 82 To the extent
that rules of conduct for law enforcement officers inhibit the effective enforcement of the law and protection of the public, society
loses. However, to the extent that the rules of conduct allow reckless and indiscriminate behavior on the part of law enforcement
personnel, society also loses. Invariably the rules of law enacted by
the legislatures on the justified use of deadly weapons by law en77. Cole v. Rife, 77 Mich. App. 545, 549, 258 N.W.2d 555, 557 (1977).
78. State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 501, 231 S.E.2d 833, 846 (1977).
79. Holloway v. Moser, 193 N.C. 185, 187, 136 S.E. 375, 376 (1927); see supra
note 18.

80. Id.
81. Liability of Police Officers, supra note 8, at 402.

82. Id.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss2/5
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forcement officers represent a balancing of these conflicting social
goals. Subdivision 2 of New York Penal Code § 35.30 is designed to
protect the innocent bystander from police action which is performed recklessly, although in the line of duty.s8 Both the legislative history and the legal import of the language selected by the
General Assembly of North Carolina indicate that the paragraph
added to G.S. 15A-401(d)(2) was similarly intended.' The General
Assembly also intended that efficient law enforcement not be inhibited by the threat of civil suit against a police officer. The addition of the paragraph to the statute is based upon the belief that
good social policy requires a law enforcement officer be authorized
to employ deadly force if that officer reasonably believes deadly
force is necessary to capture a dangerous criminal. The police officer is shielded from liability to injured innocent bystanders so
long as the officer's conduct conforms to the requirements of G.S. §
15A-401(d)(2) and does not amount to willful disregard of the
safety of others." The effect of the added paragraph is to erect a
tort liability shield for the North Carolina law enforcement officer's use of deadly force."
The implications which arise from a finding of a tort privilege
for North Carolina's law enforcement officers in the negligent use
of a deadly weapon are too far reaching to be explored fully in this
comment. However, the existence of a tort privilege plays an important role in the availability of recovery for the injured innocent
bystander in two situations: claims arising under the North Carolina Tort Claims Act 8 7 and claims arising under Chapter 42 United
States Code Section 1983. 8"
83. Hechtman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's CoNS. LAws: PNAL
LAws § 35.30 (1981).

84. See supra text accompanying notes 43 through 51 and 61 through 74.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2) (1978).

86. See supra text accompanying notes 43 through 51 and notes 61 through
74.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 et seq. (1977) (hereinafter cited as ToRT

CLAiMs AcT).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):

§ 1983: Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other persons within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immu-

nities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
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Under the North Carolina Tort Claims Act,89 a plaintiff may
sue the State of North Carolina if the injury complained of was the
proximate result of the negligence of a state employee or agency; if
the state employee or agency was acting within the scope of employment; and if the plaintiff was free of contributory negligence."0
Negligence under the Tort Claims Act is defined by common law
principles, 1 and essentially is a failure to use due care or to act as
a reasonable and prudent person would act under like circumstances.' 2 Gross negligence, on the other hand, is conduct in which
the actor is cognizant of the probable consequences of his actions
but nevertheless acts in disregard of these consequences. 9 3 Contributory negligence is no defense to a claim of gross negligence." It
has been held that because contributory negligence is a bar to recovery under the Tort Claims Act, it follows that there is no recovery under the Act for gross negligence.95 For example, the Tort
Claims Act has been invoked to hold the State liable for the negligent discharge of a firearm by a highway patrolman," but recovery
under the Act has been denied for the intentional discharge of a
firearm by a highway patrolman."
G.S. § 15A-401(d)(2) authorizes the use of deadly force, creating a tort privilege and removing any claim of negligence by an
injured suspect.9 Similarly, the last paragraph of G.S. § 15A401(d)(2) creates a tort privilege with respect to an injured innocent bystander." G.S. § 15A-401(d)(2) authorizes the use of deadly
force in certain specified situations in which deadly force is or ap89. TORT CLAIMS AcT, supra note 87.
90. Note, Torts-Distintion Between Intentional and Negligent Conduct
Under the Tort Claims Act, 35 N.C.L. Rgv. 564, 565 (1957) (hereinafter cited as
Torts).
91. MacFarlan v. North Carolina Wildlife Commission, 244 N.C. 385, 93
S.E.2d 554 (1956).
92. W. PROSSER, Torts § 31 (4th ed. 1971).
93. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 932 (5th ed. 1979); see supra note 47.
94. Torts, supra note 90, at 566.

95. Id.; see Jenkins v Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 560, 564, 94 S.E.2d
577, 581 (1956) ("That contributory negligence is made a defense lends powerful
support to the view that the negligent acts contemplated are those to which contributory negligence is no defense.").
96. Lowe v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 353, 93 S.E.2d 448 (1956).
97. Jenkins v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 560, 93 S.E.2d 557 (1956).
98. N.C. GEN STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2) (1978).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 43 through 51 and 61 through 74.
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pears to be necessary to effect an arrest or to protect life or limb. 1°0
Only if the patrolman's use of deadly force is willful, malicious or
criminally negligent will his actions be unauthorized and not privileged under the statute. 10 1 So long as the officer's conduct is privileged there is no actionable negligence. 1 2 Without actionable negli10
gence, there can be no recovery under the Tort Claims Act. 3
Similarly, because there is no recovery under the Tort Claims Act
for gross negligence,'" it follows that if the officer's conduct is willful, malicious or criminally negligent, and thereby is not privileged,
recovery under the Act will also be denied.
The provisions of G.S. § 15A-401(d)(2) also affect recovery by
a claimant under Section 1983 of the United States Code. 10 5 Traditionally, suits against law enforcement officers have been the province of state courts. '" More recently, however, Section 1983 has
been invoked as a tort remedy by parties injured by the acts of law
enforcement officers." In applying Section 1983, federal courts
have declared they are bound neither by state tort law nor any
defenses of privilege which state law may provide. '" This approach
is necessary to fullfill the purpose of Section 1983, to afford a federal claim of relief for injuries arising out of the misconduct of a
state official acting under the color and protection of state law.1 09
Conceivably, therefore, an injured bystander, who has been denied
recovery from the State or from the individual officer, might seek
recovery under Section 1983. Yet federal courts have recognized
that there is no general federal tort law and that not every tort
action arising under Section 1983 can be construed with reference
to constitutional standards.'1
Several federal cases 1 deal with the application of Section
100. N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 15A-401(d)(2) (1978).

101. Id.
102. RESTATzmENT (SscoNm) oF TORTS § 890 (1979).
103. Torts, supra note 90, at 565.
104. Torts, supra note 90, at 566; see supra note 98.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); see supra note 88.
106. Use of Deadly Force, supra note 4, at 655.
107. Id.
108. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1972); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967); Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
109. Id. (The conduct of law enforcement officers and other state officials is
subject to the standards demanded by the Constitution regardless of the requirements and the application of state law.)
110. Griffin v. Breckinridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).

111. Garner v. Memphis Police Dept., 600 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1979); Wiley v.
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1983 to suits arising from the use of deadly force by law enforcement officers in which the use of deadly force was privileged under
state law.'1 Referring to the privilege granted by a state statute,1
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals declared that although the federal courts are not bound "by whatever privilege state law may afford to the officer, we are still by no means free to elevate whatever
view of the privilege we think to be preferable to the Constitutional standards envisioned by Section 1983.' 1 " In applying the

privilege to the use of deadly force in Section 1983 actions, federal
courts must make a "studied attempt to weigh the competing interests in the light of historical and current cases and commentaries to arrive at a scope of the privilege. '"' Despite a court's desire
to require a state to conform to the Model Penal Code,116 a state's
11 7
interest in the exercise of its police power must be recognized.
So long as the application of the statutorily created privilege does
not violate constitutional standards, "the states must be given leeway in the administration of justice, at least insofar as determining
the scope of such an unsettled rule as an arresting officer's privilege for the use of deadly force." 11
' 8 Federal courts are bound to
observe a privilege in the use of deadly force so long as that privilege does not conflict with constitutional standards. 9 Federal
courts may be unwilling to limit the scope of privileges allowed at
state law for the use of deadly force in Section 1983 actions. 2 0 So
long as the privilege conferred by the North Carolina legislature
does not violate federal constitutional standards, it does not conflict with Section 1983.121 Therefore, recovery by a party, injured as
a result of the use of deadly force by a North Carolina law enforceMemphis Police Dept., 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977); Quails v. Parrish, 534 F.2d
690 (6th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 133 (6th Cir. 1975); Beech v.
Melancon, 465 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 114 (1973).

112. Id. These cases deal with the privileged use of deadly force under TENN.
§ 40-808 (1975): "REsisrNCE OF OFFICER.. . If after notice of intention of arrest, the defendant either flees or forcibly resists, the officer may use all
the force necessary to effect the arrest."
113. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-808 (1975).
CODE ANN.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 137 (6th Cir. 1975).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

119. Id.

120. Id.
121. Id.
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ment officer, may be denied.
G.S. § 15A-401(d)(2) has done much to clarify the situations in
which a law enforcement officer may use deadly force without fear
of civil or criminal liability. However, the final paragraph of G.S. §
15A-401(d)(2) does not clearly set forth the scope of the privilege
for the use of deadly force authorized by the statute. By design,
the statute contains the words "willful," "malicious" and "criminal
negligence.'1 2 These words have well established legal meanings

which imply conduct which is beyond that of simple negligence.
Taken in the context of the statute's legislative history,2 8 the
learned commentary of Professor Corbett,""4 the statements of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina 2Mand the judicial interpretation
of the analogous New York statute,226 North Carolina law enforcement officers appear to have been granted a tort privilege in the
use of deadly force which exceeds the scope of any similar privilege
granted by common law.
North Carolina has a long history of allowing liability to attach to law enforcement officers for acts which go beyond the limits of their authority.12 7 There is little indication that a law en-

forcement officer of this State has ever enjoyed as wide a privilege
against civil liability arising out of the use of deadly force.13 8 It is
ironic that a law enforcement officer, whom society expects to be
trained and well versed in the use of firearms and arrest procedures should be held to a lower standard of accountability than the
ordinary prudent person. A firearm is a dangerous instrumentality; 2 9 when handled in public, the likelihood of injuries resulting

from its negligent use is great.'30 However, G.S. § 15A-401(d)(2) is
not directed at the public but toward the law enforcement officers
of North Carolina. In the words of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, the statute was "drafted to codify and clarify those situa122. Criminal Process, supra note 41, at 413.
123. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 40 through 51.
124. Id.
125. State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 501, 231 S.E.2d 833, 846 (1977).
126. People v. Jacobs, 105 Misc. 2d 616, 618, 432 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (1980);
see supra text accompanying notes 61 through 74.
127. See supra note 75.
128. Id.
129. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928)
("Some acts such as shooting are so imminently dangerous to anyone who may
come within reach of the missile however unexpectedly, as to impose a duty of
precision not far from that of an insurer.")
130. Id.
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tions in which a police officer may use deadly force without fear of
civil or criminal liability." 31
CONCLUSION

Society has a keen interest in seeing that certain armed and
otherwise dangerous criminals not be allowed to run free among
the public. The likelihood that armed and dangerous persons will
inflict injury upon society is great; therefore, these persons should
be arrested as soon as possible. In order to effectively apprehend
these persons, the State's law enforcement officers must be allowed
to employ that amount of force that is reasonably necessary to effect an arrest and protect themselves and the public. All criminals
are not armed and dangerous, and even those who are do not always create situations which require the use of deadly force. G.S. §
15A-401(d)(2) sets forth the conditions in which the use of deadly
force by a law enforcement officer is privileged. An officer is authorized to use deadly force against only dangerous individuals3 2
and only if the officer reasonably believes the use of deadly force is
necessary." To the extent that these factors are present and to
the extent that the officer's conduct does not amount to some form
of gross negligence, the officer's use of deadly force is privileged.
The privilege extends to both civil and criminal liability which
may have attached otherwise."
In interpreting a statute, courts must adhere to the intent of
the legislature. 3 5 The best indicia of the legislative intent are "the
language of the act, the spirit of the act, and what the act seeks to
accomplish.' 3 6 From these indicia, it is apparent the General Assembly of North Carolina, in weighing competing societal interests,3 concluded that society is best served when trained law en131. State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 501, 231 S.E.2d 833, 846 (1977).
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2) (1978).

133. Id.
134. Criminal Process, supra note 41, at 413.
135. In re North Carolina Savings and Loan League, 302 N.C. 458, 467, 276
S.E.2d 404, 410 (1981).
136. Id., quoting Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 303, 188 S.E.2d
281, 283 (1972); see also, In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E.2d 367 (1978).
137. Liability of Police Officers, supra note 8, at 400-401. ("The fundamental
problem which the court must resolve in setting down a rule of law to govern
police conduct is the balancing of possible inefficiencies in the apprehension of
criminals resulting from the police officer's fear that society will have no remedy
for the wanton despotic use of the force which is placed at the police officer's
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forcement officers are authorized to employ deadly force against
dangerous criminals without fear of being subjected to civil liability for their actions.1 38 To the extent the tort privilege conferred by
G.S. § 15A-401(d)(2) removes the possibility of civil suit, the effi-

ciency of the officer is enhanced and the likelihood a dangerous
criminal will run free is decreased. It is unfortunate the statute is
not more clear on this point. The existence of a statutory tort priv-

ilege which exceeds any allowed at common law should be expressed more clearly. Because of the ambiguity of the last paragraph of G.S. § 15A-401(d)(2),

39

the existence of the tort privilege

is not readily apparent and thus is subject to misinterpretation by
courts, law enforcement officers and other civil authorities.4

0

Arvil Lee Collins

command.").
138. It can be rationally asserted that the likelihood that a dangerous criminal will inflict injury upon society is greater than the likelihood that a trained law
enforcement officer will negligently injure an innocent bystander while acting in
conformity with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2) (1978).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2) (1978):
Nothing in this subdivision constitutes justification for willful, malicious,
or criminally negligent conduct by any person which injures or endangers
any person or property, nor shall it be construed to excuse or justify the
use of unreasonable or excessive force.
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d) (2) should be amended by adding a sentence to the last paragraph of subdivision (2) so that the paragraph will read:
Nothing in this subdivision constitutes justification for willful, malicious,
or criminally negligent conduct by any person which injures or endangers
any person or property, nor shall it be construed to excuse or justify the
use of unreasonable or excessive force. Use of deadly force in compliance
with this subdivision constitutes a privilege in favor of the officer
against any criminal or civil liability resulting therefrom.
This additional sentence should make clear the scope of the privilege conferred
upon the law enforcement officer in the use of deadly force and should prevent
the misinterpretation of the legislative intent behind the statute as enacted.
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